Foreign-owned firms exhibit widely-documented productivity advantages over domestic firms. To interpret this stylized fact, we model the relationships between FDI flows and national productivity distributions across firms in an international oligopoly. Industrial structure is determined endogenously, and both greenfield-and acquisition-FDI are allowed for. The technology gap between firms interacts with localized spillovers to determine greenfield-FDI incentives and with within-firm technology transfer to determine the profitability of acquisition-FDI. Greenfield-and acquisition-FDI also affect the profitability of entry into the industry differently. We contrast our results with the insights of Dunning's well-known OLI framework on the causes of FDI flows.
Introduction
It is well established that foreign-owned plants generally exhibit higher labour productivity than domestically-owned ones within the same industry. This stylized fact is robust across both host countries and host industries. For the UK, the data presented by Gri±th et al. (2004, Table 3) imply that, over the period 1998-2001, foreign-owned plants in the production sector enjoyed, on average, 25% higher labour productivity (i.e., value-added per employee) than their UK-owned rivals. Importantly, this statistic controls for the inter-industry distribution of plants by disaggregating the overall production sector into more than 100 separate industries. 1 Moreover, international evidence suggests that the \productivity advantage" of foreign-owned¯rms is not a peculiar characteristic of the UK economy. Globerman et al. (1994) found a similar productivity gap between foreign-and domestically-owned plants in Canada, and in their study of US manufacturing Doms and Jensen (1998) found that, in terms of productivity gaps, the signi¯cant di®erence is between multinational enterprises (MNEs) and non-MNEs, not between foreign-and domestically-owned¯rms. 2 Labour productivity can, of course, vary across plants for a variety of reasons in addition to total factor productivity (TFP) di®erences: e.g., di®erences in physical and human capital intensities and in monopoly power in the product market. However, in order to facilitate a clear and tractable analysis, we focus on that part of the \productivity advantage" which is due to higher TFP (i.e., superior process technologies) in foreign-owned plants. 3 We investigate the relationships between foreign direct investment (FDI) in°ows and out-°o ws and national TFP distributions across plants (hereafter, \productivity distributions") in an international oligopoly. Our aim is to provide a theoretical analysis of the sources of foreign-owned¯rms' observed \productivity advantages." Our model allows for localized inter-¯rm productivity spillovers, within-¯rm (plant-to-plant) technology transfer, and two forms of FDI, green¯eld and acquisition. 4 National productivity distributions are determined endogenously in the perfect equilibrium of a game where¯rms¯rst choose production locations (and, if relevant, the form of FDI) and then compete on national product markets. Therefore, our paper contributes to the game-theoretic literature on endogenous market structures in international trade (e.g., Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; Rowthorn, 1992; Petit and Sanna-Randaccio, 2000) . However, whereas that literature focussed on the green¯eld-FDI vs. exporting decisions of identical¯rms in a cross-hauling setting, we allow for TFP di®erences across¯rms and for acquisition-FDI, both of which are empirically important. Although¯rms di®er in their initial TFP levels, we assume potential host countries to be identical. Our model therefore follows recent empirical work (e.g., Doms and Jensen, 1998; Criscuolo and Martin, 2005) in emphasising the role of¯rm types (MNE vs. non-MNE), rather than nationality of ownership per se, in explaining the observed productivity leads of foreign-owned plants. 5 Two characteristics of the national productivity distributions in the industry considered are endogenously determined in our model:¯rst, plants can be either high-or lowproductivity (there are two process technologies); and, second, the number of plants is endogenously determined at equilibrium (the model contains both incumbent¯rms and the possibility of de novo entry). There are three ways in which¯rms' FDI decisions interact with a national productivity distribution in the industry modelled. First, if an incumbent rm undertakes either form of FDI, productivity spillovers can occur between the MNE's newly-established branch plant abroad and rival¯rms located in the host country. Spillovers can only occur between plants located in the same country (i.e., they are localized), and they can°ow in both directions between a foreign branch plant and local rivals. For example, a technological laggard may undertake FDI in an attempt to \source" technology via spillovers from (more productive) local¯rms. 6 The relationship between FDI decisions and spillovers is two-way: if a foreign technological leader undertakes inward FDI, the productivity of local¯rms may be raised via spillovers; therefore, the technological leader will allow for this potential dissipation of its advantage when choosing between exporting and FDI. 7
\concentration e®ect" of acquisition-FDI in the data); and neither type of FDI is ever reported as being trivially important in aggregate global°ows (UNCTAD, 2000) . Moreover, when speci¯cally considering the genesis of national productivity distributions, the green¯eld/ acqusition distinction matters because of a further qualitative di®erence: unlike green¯eld, acquisition gives MNEs the option of buying technology.
5 Note that the only \nationality e®ect" highlighted by Oulton (2001) is US vs. non-US ownership.
6 A number of empirical studies¯nd that FDI is used to \source" technology in this way. See, inter alia, Kogut and Chang (1991) , Neven and Siotis (1996) , van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) , and Dri±eld and Love (2003) .
7 Related analyses of the green¯eld/exporting choice in the presence of spillovers are presented by Fosfuri and Motta (1999) and Siotis (1999) .
The second way in which¯rms' FDI decisions interact with national productivity distributions is through within-¯rm transfers of technology between plants in MNEs. Technology is a public good within the¯rm, and¯rms use their most productive technology in all their plants. 8 Our modelling structure allows the high-productivity incumbent to purchase the low-productivity incumbent abroad. Following this°ow of acquisition-FDI, intra-¯rm technology transfer occurs: the high-productivity purchaser is able costlessly to install its (superior) technology in the acquired plant abroad. 9 Therefore, increases in the acquirer's technological lead increase the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI. Intra-¯rm technology transfer also occurs when an initially-laggardly¯rm \brings home" a spillover received abroad by its foreign branch plant. 10
Third, FDI decisions interact with national productivity distributions through the relationship between the incumbents' green¯eld/acquisition choice and the potential entrant's decision. Green¯eld-and acquisition-FDI result { when the potential entrant comes to make her choice { in di®erent industrial structures, and thus di®erent entry \incentives." Specifically, if the incumbents undertake acquisition-FDI, the industry becomes more \concen-trated" than if they had remained as independent¯rms, and therefore the pro¯tability of entry for the outside¯rm rises. 11 This explains why we¯nd that the equilibrium occurrence of acquisition-FDI is non-monotonic in the¯xed cost of additional plants. There exists ā xed-cost interval where acquisition provokes subsequent de novo entry into the industry but green¯eld and exporting do not. Therefore, in this interval, acquisition-FDI is not pro¯table (in the sense of Salant et al., 1983) because the acquirer's rents would be competed away by subsequent entry. However, on both sides of this interval, where the potential entrant's optimal choice is independent of the incumbents' green¯eld/acquisition choice, acquisition-FDI does arise in equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium occurrence of acquisition-FDI is U-shaped in the plant¯xed cost.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 contain, respectively, a formal description of our modelling structure and an analysis of its equilibrium properties.
8 Fors (1997) shows that substantial between-plant technology transfer occurs within Swedish MNEs.
9 Our concept of intra-¯rm technology transfer is identical to that used by Long and Vousden (1995) , who assume that every plant in a merged¯rm operates at the minimum marginal cost of its constituent plants before the merger. Mattoo et al. (2004) present a model of costly technology tranfer following acquisition-FDI; however, they do not allow for technology-sourcing motives for FDI, which appear empirically signi¯cant.
10 For an empirical analysis of this phenomenon, see Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) .
11 One might say that, relative to serving the foreign market by exporting or green¯eld-FDI, acquisition-FDI is a \soft" response to the entry threat. UNCTAD (2000) , in an empirical survey, shows that intra-industry acquisition-FDI is more likely to trigger entry into the industry than green¯eld-FDI.
In Section 4 we conclude by contrasting our account of the relationship between FDI°ows and MNEs' observed \productivity advantages" with that o®ered by Dunning's famous (1977) OLI paradigm.
Model
There are two countries in the world, 1 and 2, and two incumbent¯rms, one in each country.
At the start of the game¯rm M (the potential MNE via acquisition-FDI) owns a plant in 1 and¯rm T (the potential acquisition target) owns a plant in 2. The¯rms in our model produce homogeneous goods for sale on the identical national product markets of 1 and 2, and international trade incurs a speci¯c trade cost of t. Market demand in either country is
where ¹ measures the \size" of either country.
There are two distinct technologies for producing the homogeneous product, both of which exhibit constant marginal costs. Technology is assumed to be a public good (i.e., non-rival) within the¯rm and intra-¯rm technology transfer is costless. Firm M's initial technology has a marginal production cost of c M and¯rm T 's has a marginal production cost of c T . We assume that any di®erence between c M and c T is due entirely to di®erences in TFP between the two technologies. 12 We maintain the following assumption on c M and
Assumption A implies that M's initial technology is more productive than T 's. It is quite conventional in the literature to assume that acquiring MNEs possess \productivity advantages" over their targets (e.g. Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi, 2004) . In Section 4 we discuss the reasons behind this conventional assumption and explore the implications of relaxing A to allow for c M > c T .
Given the initial conditions described above, Figure 1 depicts our four-stage game of complete information. In stage one, M chooses between fX; G; Ag, where each element represents a di®erent method of serving the product market in country 2. X is M's exporting option: M builds no additional plants, and it serves 1's product market with local production at a marginal cost of c M and 2's product market via international trade at a marginal cost 12 Factor prices are therefore implicitly assumed to be identical across countries.
of c M + t. By choosing either G or A, M becomes a two-plant MNE. G represents green¯eld-FDI : M builds an additional plant in 2 at a sunk cost of F and serves both countries' product markets from local production at a marginal cost of c M . A represents acquisition-FDI : M makes T a take-it-or-leave-it o®er of an acquisition price. If T accepts M's o®er, M transfers its superior technology to T 's plant and serves both countries' product markets from local production at a marginal cost of c M ; thereafter, we skip stage two (T 's choice). If T rejects M's takeover o®er, then M must choose between X and G. These assumptions imply that the equilibrium takeover price equals T 's expected pro¯ts under M's next-best (i.e., \threat point") strategy (X or G), and that M captures the entire surplus created by the takeover. 13
In stage two, which only arises if M chooses X or G in stage one, T chooses from a strategy space of fX; Gg, where the elements are analogous to those in M's strategy space.
The key di®erence is that T 's initial technology has a marginal production cost of c T > c M .
To secure a marginal production cost of c M , T must rely on productivity spillovers, which are described below. 14 In stage three, a single potential entrant (¯rm E) decides whether to enter the industry with a single plant at a sunk cost of F (strategy G) or to remain outside the industry (strategy ?). E's marginal production cost is c T , so M initially possesses a \productivity advantage" over both its rivals under assumption A. We make three important assumptions about E's options. First, E can only enter with one plant. Second, E has insu±cient \capacity" to absorb spillovers. 15 Third, E cannot merge with another¯rm: green¯eld entry is E's only possible entry strategy. All three assumptions can be rationalised in terms of E's being new to the industry. 16
Stage four is the market stage: at the end of stage four all¯rms in the industry compete µ a la Cournot to serve both national product markets. Spillovers occur at the start of stage four before the production of outputs. If¯rms M and T are located in the same country, then with probability µ M's technology spills over to T . 17 Therefore, spillovers are localized. If T owns two plants and receives a spillover in one country, it can costlessly apply its new technology to production in both countries (i.e., intra-¯rm technology transfer is costless). We assume that the probability of spillovers is identical and independent across countries. The magnitude of µ will be determined by factors such as the degree of skilled-worker mobility between¯rms and the scope of intellectual property rights protection (BlomstrÄ om and Kokko, 1998). After spillovers have occurred,¯rms produce outputs. We assume that marginal production costs are common knowledge.
We solve the game backwards to isolate its subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies (¯rms are risk neutral). To avoid extensive and unrewarding taxonomy, we place restrictions on the marginal cost parameters, c M , c T and t, to ensure that all Cournot equilibria are interior. Given market demand in (1),¯rm i's variable pro¯ts at an interior Cournot equilibrium are
where N is the number of¯rms and c i , c ¡i are (respectively) i's marginal cost and the sum of i's rivals' marginal costs. The (¢) 2 term therefore represents variable pro¯ts per head.
We will use the following notations for a¯rm's variable pro¯ts per head:
for all possible Cournot equilibria to be interior. 18
Some of the equilibrium properties of our model are derived analytically; however, due to its mathematical intractability, we solve for the perfect equilibrium numerically for three sets of marginal cost parameters (all consistent with interior Cournot equilibria). These are:
c M = 0:2; c T = 0:25; t = 0:05 (S1)
17 It is quite common in the R&D literature (e.g., d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) to leave the spillover mechanism as a \black box." Moreover, the simplicity of our spillover mechanism implies (ceteris paribus) a simple overall game structure relative to the case where the spillover mechanism is explicitly modelled (e.g., Fosfuri et al., 2001) . In turn, this allows us to extend the game structure in other directions while retaining tractability. For example, Fosfuri et al. (2001) restrict their attention to market equilibria in a single host country for green¯eld-FDI. By contrast, our model comprises two host countries for FDI and two types of FDI.
18 The RHS is the equilibrium price in a Cournot duopoly where both¯rms have marginal costs of cM . This condition ensures that E will export to the foreign country in the \most competitive" case where M and T both have plants there and T bene¯ts from spillovers. S1 is the benchmark case. S2 represents a widening of the productivity gap between M and T . 19 Relative to S1, S3 represents a doubling of trade costs.
Analysis

The Potential Entrant's Decision
We begin with E's entry decision in stage 3. We write E's expected variable pro¯ts per head
as ¼ E (¢), where the arguments in (¢) are the¯rms' location choices (written in the order that they are taken { M then T then E). It is straightforward to show that 20
In response to A, (X; X) and (G; G), E is indi®erent between the two locations. However, in the (X; X) case,¯rms M and T are not indi®erent about E's location; for simplicity, we assume that, when indi®erent, E picks country 1 to locate near M 's initial plant. 21 In response to both (X; G) and (G; X), E strictly prefers locating its single plant in the country containing only one plant (i.e., country 2 for (X; G) and country 1 for (G; X)), earning the same expected pro¯ts in both cases. 22
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
19 If¯rms' production functions exhibit constant returns to scale and take the form AF (K; L), where A measures TFP and F (¢) is common, then M has 25% higher TFP than T in S1 and 50% higher TFP in S2.
20 By convention, E's pro¯ts on local sales are written before its pro¯ts on exports. E's total expected pro¯ts are ¹¼E (¢; G) ¡ F .
21 Perhaps E hopes to receive spillovers from M at some inde¯nite future time. Alternatively, country 1 may be in¯nitesimally cheaper than 2 for E.
22 In response to both (X; G) and (G; X), it is straightforward to show that E's variable pro¯ts if it chooses the one-plant country are larger in both the \spillover" and \no spillover" states than if it locates in the two-plant country. Figure 2 shows, in (µ; F=¹)-space, the prior choices by¯rms M and T that will provoke subsequent entry by E. 23 Entry is \more likely" to occur when the incumbents monopolize the industry via acquisition-FDI than in any of the \duopoly" cases where M and T remain independent and choose between X and G. This is intuitive: post-entry, E would rather be a duopolist than a triopolist. Furthermore, within the \duopoly" cases where M and T remain independent, E is \less likely" to enter the industry, the more plants the incumbents establish via green¯eld-FDI. This is because a choice by either incumbent of G over X lowers the general level of marginal costs in the industry (i.e., intensi¯es \competition"): the investing¯rm's marginal cost of serving the foreign market falls by t, and the probability that T receives a spillover rises.
The comparative statics in Fig. 2 are intuitive: increases in F=¹ and µ both make entry \less likely" (i.e. entry occurs in response to fewer pairs of prior choices). A rise in µ cuts the likelihood of entry because it raises the probability that T obtains a low marginal cost via spillovers. Rises in both c T and t shift the inter-regional boundaries downwards because E's marginal costs rise.
Equilibrium Industrial Structures
In stage 2 T , if it remains an independent¯rm, chooses between X and G. Assume that M has previously chosen X and that F=¹ > ¼ E (X; X; G) so that, for both choices by T , E chooses ? (see Fig. 2 ). T 's expected variable pro¯ts per head are
and T optimally undertakes green¯eld-FDI if and only if
The L.H.S. term ¼ T (X; G; ?) ¡ ¼ T (X; X; ?) measures T 's \incentive" to undertake green¯eld-FDI. It is straightforward to verify that increases in t and µ both increase ¼ T (X; G; ?)¡ ¼ T (X; X; ?). The former e®ect is due to a strengthened \tari®-jumping" motive for green¯eld-FDI as trade costs rise (Motta, 1992) , 24 and the latter re°ects a strengthened \technology-sourcing" motive for green¯eld-FDI as spillovers become more likely. The e®ect of changing the productivity gap on T 's green¯eld-FDI incentive is more complex: increasing c T makes green¯eld-FDI less pro¯table for T if µ is small but more pro¯table if µ is large. These properties of T 's green¯eld-FDI incentive hold generally in our model. 25 T 's expected pro¯ts under other pairs of choices by M and E are de¯ned in the Appendix.
Turning to M's stage-one decision, we¯rst consider the choice between X and G. Assume that T and E will play X and ? respectively in response to either choice by M . 26 M's expected variable pro¯ts per head are
and M optimally chooses G if and only if
As with T , M's green¯eld-FDI incentive is increasing in t. However, in contrast to T , M's green¯eld-FDI incentive weakens if µ rises because the saving in trade costs from green¯eld-FDI must be o®set against a greater likelihood that M's technological lead will be dissipated via spillovers in the host country. Also in contrast to T , widening the productivity gap (i.e., cutting c M ) strengthens M's green¯eld-FDI incentive if µ is small but weakens it if µ is large.
M's expected pro¯ts under other pairs of choices by T and E are de¯ned in the Appendix.
M's expected variable pro¯ts per head following acquisition-FDI are
Assume that E optimally chooses ? following A and that the perfect equilibrium if
A is ruled out is (X; X; ?). 27 Therefore, the smallest takeover price T will accept is an area where, in equilibrium, the incumbents choose either green¯eld-FDI or exporting and no entry occurs. Therefore, our¯rst observation is that the equilibrium occurrence of acquisition-FDI is non-monotonic in the per-capita¯xed cost of additional plants. If we exclude the lowest (G; G; G) equilibrium region (i.e., consider su±ciently large F=¹), we¯nd that the equilibrium occurrence of acquisition-FDI is U-shaped in F=¹.
The intuition behind this non-monotonicity result is straightforward. Entry is more profitable following acquisition-FDI when there is just one incumbent¯rm (and entry generates a duopoly) than when there are two incumbents (and entry generates a triopoly). This observation translates into Figs. 3-5 as follows. In the (G; G; G) and (A; G) regions, entry occurs both following acquisition-FDI and at the \threat point." 29 The existence of the (A; G) region re°ects a substitution of acquisition-FDI for green¯eld-FDI at the threat point as F=¹ rises. In the (A; ?) region, entry is blockaded, so acquisition-FDI, which leads to monopolization and cost reduction, 30 is pro¯table. Between the (A; G) and (A; ?) regions, 28 In each simulation we considered a 55-cell grid in (µ; F=¹)-space: µ ranged from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.25, and F=¹ (£100) ranged from 0 to 10 in steps of 1. Further numerical experimentation has shown our qualitative results to be quite robust to changes in the marginal cost parameters.
29 By \threat point" we mean the game's perfect equilibrium when M 's strategy space is restricted to fX; Gg { i.e., the alternative to acquisition-FDI. A full description of the game's threat points in S1, S2 and S3 is available from the author on request.
30 Following acquisition-FDI, all units are produced at c M and no international trade occurs. entry occurs following acquisition-FDI but not at the threat point. Because acquisition-FDI provokes entry, which reduces the integrated¯rm's pro¯ts, the incumbents' joint pro¯ts are higher at the threat point, and acquisition-FDI does not occur in equilibrium.
Changing µ, the probability of spillovers, has two comparative-statics e®ects. First, it may imply a movement across a solid inter-regional boundary: as µ rises, the (A; G) region gets squeezed from both above and below. 31 This occurs because the general level of industry marginal costs at the threat point is falling in µ, which cuts the pro¯tability of acquisition-FDI where costs and pro¯ts are independent of µ. 32 Second, where the incumbents choose between X and G in equilibrium, a rise in µ makes M \less likely" to undertake green¯eld-FDI but T \more likely." 33 This follows from the link between green¯eld-FDI and localized spillovers, which M wants to avoid but T wants to encourage.
Comparing Fig. 3 to Figs. 4 and 5, we can see that increasing c T and t tends to shift the solid inter-regional boundaries downwards. This occurs because both changes cut the pro¯tability of entry. Increasing c T also makes T \more likely" to undertake technologysourcing green¯eld-FDI in the region where both incumbents choose between X and G and no entry occurs. 34 Finally, comparing Fig. 5 to Fig. 3 shows that both incumbents are \more likely" to choose green¯eld-FDI over exporting when the trade cost rises.
Our analysis of equilibrium industrial structures has generated several testable hypotheses on the relationships between FDI°ows and structural parameters. Four of these are brought together in the following Proposition.
Proposition. Comparative-statics predictions on equilibrium FDI°ows:
(i) Both types of FDI°ow are non-monotonic in the degree of economies of scale (F=¹).
For su±ciently large scale economies, acquisition-FDI (green¯eld-FDI)°ows are U-(hump-) shaped in the degree of economies of scale.
(ii) A rise in the magnitude of spillovers (µ) makes technological leaders (laggards) less (more) likely to choose green¯eld-FDI over exporting. 31 The bottom of the (A; ?) region is horizontal because E cannot absorb spillovers so ¼E (A; G) is independent of µ.
32 When M and T are co-located at the threat point, a rise in µ harms M but bene¯ts T by more.
33 In Figs. 3-5 , there are two cases where a rise in µ causes M to switch from G to X between cells and one case of a switch in the opposite direction. There are three cases where moving rightwards prompts T to switch from X to G and only one in the opposite direction. 34 In that region, T chooses G in 13 cells in Fig. 4 but only 4 cells in Fig. 3 . M chooses G in 2 cells in both Figs. but, as we showed above, its green¯eld-FDI incentive is weaker (for su±ciently large µ) in Fig. 4 . 
Discussion
By way of conclusion, we compare the relationships between national productivity distributions and FDI°ows in our model to those highlighted by Dunning's (1977) OLI (ownershiplocation-internalisation) framework. OLI argues that a necessary condition for undertaking FDI is that the potential MNE possess a (proprietary) \ownership advantage" relative to local rivals in the host country (e.g., a highly productive technology). This is needed to o®set the increased costs of co-ordinating business activities across international borders. 35 It follows that the observed productivity advantages of foreign-owned MNEs are embodied in their FDI in°ows: either a highly productive new plant is established via green¯eld-FDI, or the technology in a pre-existing plant is upgraded following acquisition-FDI (intra-¯rm technology transfer).
In our model, in contrast, the possession of¯rm-speci¯c ownership advantages is evidently unnecessary for green¯eld-FDI. Although¯rm M, the technological leader, can be observed undertaking green¯eld-FDI in equilibrium, so can¯rm T , the laggard. Ownership advantages are unnecessary for green¯eld-FDI in our model because the scale of potential entry is limited (and we respect the integer constraint on the number of¯rms), so even laggardly¯rms can earn supernormal pro¯ts in equilibrium . Moreover, in direct contrast to OLI, the presence of (su±ciently strong) localized spillovers means that an increase in M's technological lead reduces its incentive for technology-dissipating green¯eld-FDI but strengthens T 's incentive for technology-sourcing green¯eld-FDI. 36
35 Markusen (1995) describes the OLI framework. OLI's conclusions are consistent with an assumption of monopolistic competition (although such an assumption is not explicitly stated). If the representative local rm earns only normal pro¯ts in long-run equilibrium (due to free entry) and foreign MNEs face higher costs than local¯rms, then an ownership advantage is necessary to make FDI break even. (For FDI to occur, OLI also requires \location" and \internalisation" advantages, neither of which are relevant to our analysis.) Therefore, our model can be viewed as examining whether OLI-type insights generalize to a Cournot oligopoly with limited potential entry.
The OLI paradigm draws no sharp distinction between green¯eld-and acquisition-FDI. 37 However, we found that the two forms of FDI are associated with di®erent equilibrium industrial structures. Through its e®ect on concentration and therefore E's entry incentives, the green¯eld/acquisition choice exerts an important in°uence on equilibria. Furthermore, although we set the model up by assuming that M is the purchaser, this assumption is not necessary to support our perfect equilibria (Figs. 3-5) . We could relabel the model with¯rm T , the low-productivity incumbent, as the potential acquirer without altering its equilibruim predictions. 38 Therefore, short of assuming a purchaser, the international direction of acquisition-FDI°ow in equilibrium in our model is indeterminate. It follows that whenever incentives for \technology-embodied" acquisition-FDI exist (leader buys laggard), so do those for \cherry-picking" acquisition-FDI (laggard buys leader), and the view that foreign MNEs' productivity advantages are necessarily embodied in their FDI in°ows is without theoretical support from our model. 39
This paper has examined the relationships between FDI°ows and national productivity distributions in an international oligopoly. We have generated a number of testable hypotheses on the relationships between FDI°ows and structural parameters (e.g., the nonmonotonicity of acquisition-FDI°ows in F=¹, which could be interpreted empirically as scale economies). We have also questioned the applicability of some of the insights of the OLI framework to an explicitly oligopolistic market structure with limited potential entry.
Our model could be extended in several directions. In particular, the magnitude of µ, the probability of spillovers, could be determined endogenously by¯rms' actions. A technological leader would want to minimize µ (e.g., by adopting hard-to-copy technologies, retaining trained workers with wage premia, and lobbying for tough patent protection), but a laggard would want to maximize it. Investigating this and other issues will form the basis of future work.
have proved rather di±cult to locate in the data (GÄ org and Greenaway, 2004) . Perhaps the fear of spillovers deters inward green¯eld-FDI by foreign technological leaders, which lowers the volume of realised spillovers. 
